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Abstract 
  
Deflationary views have emerged in many areas of philosophy over the past several 
decades. In the art world, one of the most significant deflationary approaches toward 
aesthetic experience has been taken by Noël Carroll in his collection of essays, Beyond 
Aesthetics (2001). The modus operandi of such an approach, according to Carroll, is to 
emphasize the context (historical, cultural, political, etc.) in which an art experience is 
embedded and explain its significance relative to a particular narrative. Interestingly, 
there is a precursor to this type of view that predates it by roughly eighty years. This is 
the account of aesthetic experience given by John Dewey. Although Carroll 
acknowledges Dewey’s contribution to the concept of aesthetic experience, he fails to see 
how Dewey laid some of the groundwork for not only his own deflationary account but 
also for a conception of aesthetic experience that is continuous with other facets of 
human experience. This paper will highlight the similarities between the two approaches 
with the aim of establishing Dewey’s work as a forerunner to deflationary-type 
approaches. 
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1. Introduction  
William James once remarked that all philosophies wear the same form. Wherein, 
the philosopher launches herself upon a sea of speculation, “ascends into the empyrean, 
and communes with the eternal essences.”1 But, as James claimed, if the result of such a 
voyage does not usher in some new practical directive, or refute some old one, the trip is 
a waste. Such a statement, while relevant to all philosophical pursuits, is perhaps most 
noteworthy in connection with aesthetics, since that branch of philosophical inquiry 
trades on the abstract notions which surround the concept of ideal beauty. In Beyond 
Aesthetics (2001), Noël Carroll echoes James’ sentiment by emphasizing the divide 
between abstraction on one hand and everyday life on the other within the philosophy of 
art. On his view, the notion of “the aesthetic” is one of the largest obstacles that any 
comprehensible account of art must overcome. Art philosophies, according to Carroll, 
have an inexorable tendency toward abstract notions, rooted in the aesthetic, which have 
resulted in the estrangement of art from history and culture. In order to recover an 
intelligible theory of art, philosophers must, as Carroll puts it, “reach beyond aesthetic 
theories of art and their various prohibitions. That is, we must not identify the essence of 
art with the intended capacity of artworks to afford aesthetic experience.”2 
In this regard, Carroll hopes to rehabilitate the use of history, authorial intent, and 
emotional and moral responses in the interpretation of art and the aesthetic. He 
admittedly follows the influence of his mentor, George Dickie, to whom Beyond 
Aesthetics is dedicated, in rejecting a conception of art that is “defined in terms of the 
 
1 James, William. “Reflex Action and Theism,” from The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular 
Philosophy. Dover: 1956, p. 142-3 
2 Carroll, Noël. Beyond Aesthetics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. p. 1 
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intended capacity of certain objects to support aesthetic experiences.”3 Like Dickie, 
Carroll undermines various, traditional theories of the aesthetic in order to rein them in 
under a new theory, albeit, not the institutional one expounded by Dickie. Instead, he 
offers a theory which shares with Dickie’s view an emphasis on the narrative aspects of 
the art object’s interaction with its audience, but stops short of the assertion that an 
object’s situatedness within art-world institutions is its only source of aesthetic merit. 
  In the first place, Carroll rejects a view of aesthetic experience based on 
“disinterestedness,” i.e. the attitude one takes when appreciating art for its intrinsic value, 
in order to lend primacy to the narrative aspects of art. During the first half of the 20th 
century, disinterestedness reached its height with the rise of both the object-formalism of 
Clive Bell, which sought to treat the aesthetic object as being divorced from its 
cultural/historical origins, and the experience-formalism of Monroe Beardsley, which 
viewed aesthetic experience as being divorced from both authorial intent and emotional 
response.4 However, the particular sense in which these thinkers used the term 
“experience,” and that which has led to Carroll’s misunderstanding of Dewey, will have 
significant import for this analysis. In posing his alternative theory – what he calls “the 
narrative approach” – the lion’s share of Carroll’s criticism is leveled at Bell, Beardsley 
and others of their ilk, who treated the capacity of a work to generate aesthetic experience 
as the deciding factor in its status as art. In the third essay of Beyond Aesthetics, “Four 
Concepts of Aesthetic Experiences,” Carroll makes his most overt challenge to this view 
by critiquing three of the prevailing accounts of aesthetic experience – viz. the traditional, 
the pragmatic, and the allegorical. Therein, he hopes to replace these established views of 
 
3 Ibid. p. 2 
4 cf. "The Intentional Fallacy." & "The Affective Fallacy." in Wimsatt, W. K., and Monroe C. Beardsley, 
The Verbal Icon. Lexington, KY: U of Kentucky, 1954.    
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aesthetic experience with an account that he calls “deflationary,” due to its emphasis on 
the content (formal, cultural, emotional, or otherwise) of aesthetic experience, on one 
hand, and the significance such an experience holds for the observer, on the other.  
On a deflationary view, “interpretation (in contrast to aesthetic experience) is an 
art-appropriate response at least as significant as aesthetic experience.”5 With this 
account, Carroll hopes to debunk the myth that aesthetic experience is solely an 
interaction between an object and a detached observer, an interaction that would be 
primarily “perceptual.” In general terms, a deflationary account of aesthetic experience is 
a clear rejection of traditional empiricist notions about experience, i.e. those notions 
based on, at least, an epistemological dualism (between knower and known) if not a 
metaphysical one (between mind and world.) 
  However, one oddity in Beyond Aesthetics, is the wholesale rejection it apparently 
makes of the pragmatic conception of aesthetic experience, which Carroll attributes, 
almost exclusively, to John Dewey. In light of the pragmatist aversion, especially 
Dewey’s, toward traditionally empiricist explanations, this rejection seems misplaced. As 
I will argue in what follows, Carroll bases his summary treatment of the pragmatic 
account on a very narrow interpretation of what Dewey called “consummatory” 
experiences, an interpretation that is, at best, only marginally supported by Dewey’s 
writings. I believe ample evidence can be found, particularly in Dewey’s Art as 
Experience (1934), to undermine Carroll’s interpretation. Furthermore, it seems clear that 
a rejection of a Deweyan stance toward aesthetic experience is vital neither to Carroll’s 
proximal goal of underscoring content and interpretation in aesthetic experience, nor his 
ultimate goal of offering a narrative account of art.  
 
5 Carroll, p. 2 
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I shall contend that Carroll missed the opportunity to enlist Dewey as an ally in 
framing his deflationary account. As such, the first third of this essay will largely consist 
in exegesis of Carroll’s attack on theories of aesthetic experience and will highlight how 
well the alternative features of his deflationary view aid in accomplishing a narrative 
account of art. The second part will address Carroll’s treatment of Dewey, with special 
attention paid to the notions of consummatory experience and what Dewey called 
“selective interest.” The final portion will be devoted primarily to Dewey’s notion of 
context, since it is my belief that, given the evidence, it is this concept which makes his 
notion of experience contiguous with Carroll’s attempt to move Beyond Aesthetics. Thus, 
the point of this paper, while mostly an academic one, could lead to a change in how 
Dewey’s influence on contemporary aesthetics is viewed, not merely among 
Americanists, but for aestheticians, generally.6     
                    
2. Aesthetic Experience and a Narrative Approach 
In the realm of art criticism, Carroll tells us, there are two types of critic – 
decipherers and aesthetes. Decipherers are those who look for and interpret the relevant 
conceptual schemes that are implicit in a particular work, i.e. they decode the (often 
political) message for the rest of us. Carroll calls this school of criticism the interpretive, 
for obvious reasons. On the other hand are the aesthetes, who demonstrate (Carroll also 
calls this school the “demonstrative”) the important concrete features in a work in order 
to elicit in an audience a sense of appreciation. For the aesthete, art should not have a 
message, especially one of a political bent, but instead should promote aesthetic 
experiences. Carroll points out that the decipherers, who developed their interpretive 
 
6 In this regard, my presentation and interpretation of Dewey’s philosophy is particularly indebted to the 
work of Thomas Alexander, James Gouinlock, and Richard Shusterman.  
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school partly as a reaction to earlier aestheticism, have been more prevalent in recent 
critical practice – corresponding roughly with the rise of postmodernist philosophies. 
Much of the art world, he explains, “has come to be dominated by identity politics, 
rhetorically advancing, for the sake of emancipatory empowerment, claims for equal 
treatment toward women, gays, the disabled, and ethnic and racial minorities.”7 More 
recently, Carroll claims, this trend has been beset by a growing number of critics who 
“call for artists to return to the vocation of producing beauty.”8 But Carroll sees the battle 
between decipherer and aesthete as largely artificial, and the key to reuniting the two, he 
believes, is aesthetic experience. 
It should be noted that Carroll’s distinction between aesthete and decipherer 
corresponds roughly with the distinction others have made between analytic and 
continental approaches to aesthetics. Richard Shusterman, for one, has pointed out in his 
Pragmatist Aesthetics (1992) that the distinction can be traced back to a 
Kantian/Hegelian divide and has suggested a pragmatic approach (particularly Dewey’s) 
is a “promising middle way and mediator” between these views.9 And, a via media 
between the aesthete and the decipherer is just what Carroll seeks. As he puts it,  
  …no comprehensive approach to the arts can ignore aesthetic 
experience…There is no reason to suppose that interpretive criticism and 
aesthetic criticism cannot coexist; indeed, they are generally mutually 
informative and often complimentary.10 
 
Yet, instead of employing Dewey’s pragmatic approach, Carroll hopes to bring together 
the best parts of descriptivism and interpretivism by critiquing the treatment of aesthetic 
 
7 Carroll, p. 42 
8 Ibid. 
9 Cf. Shusterman, Richard. Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living Beauty, Rethinking Art. New York: Blackwell, 
1992. 
10 Ibid., p. 43 
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experience among some of the more canonical movements in the philosophy of art, 
including Dewey’s pragmatism.  
The first account of aesthetic experience that Carroll examines is what he calls the 
“traditional” one. This view could just as easily be called the contemplative, due to the 
emphasis it places on rational contemplation, for its own sake, of artworks. The form this 
account most often takes, Carroll tells us, follows Kant and Hutcheson insofar as it 
frames its argument in terms of disinterested pleasure, i.e. it views contemplation as 
pleasurable without any instrumental or ulterior motives. Claiming to find an experience 
worthwhile or pleasurable in and of itself is the hallmark of the traditional account, which 
is most obvious in philosophical accounts of the sublime.  
Carroll notes that the traditional account has been most often associated with 
demonstrative (or aesthetic) theories of art, and more particularly, with the primary target 
of Beyond Aesthetics, the formalism of Clive Bell. “Formalism,” according to Carroll, “is 
the best known example of an aesthetic theory of art.”11 Yet, he believes that formalism 
fails empirically. As he puts it, 
Undoubtedly, formalists place emphasis on abstract structures just because 
those are less likely to invite contemplation of the artwork in terms of 
ulterior interests, like political content…it is an unpersuasive theory of art 
for the obvious reason that much art has not been produced with the 
intention to afford appreciable experiences of structure [Ibid.]12 
 
Formalism may also fail insofar as it alleges that functional responses to works are 
inappropriate, despite a rather large number of works that seem aimed at eliciting just 
those types of responses. Moreover, there are many cases where appreciation for the 
structures of a work is dependent upon understanding its functional content. 
 
11 Carroll, p. 45 
12 Ibid. 
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 Of course, there are other expressions of demonstrative/aesthetic theories, not so 
heavily reliant upon the formal structures of artworks, which still place a premium on the 
contemplative appreciation of art and hold to a version of the traditional account of 
aesthetic experience. However, these fail as well when one considers the numerous works 
which demonstrate intention of producing something quite apart from aesthetic 
experience (e.g. the imagery used in voodoo artifacts). 
 As Carroll notes, the failure of demonstrative theories of art need not imply the 
traditional account is itself deficient. If we consider this account apart from the function 
of defining art in which demonstrative theories employ it, it may yet be a worthwhile 
explanation of aesthetic experience. After all, it seems quite natural to claim that we 
value the experience of beauty for its own sake. Philosophers have made similar intrinsic 
claims about other notions like truth, justice, and even humor. But, as Carroll points out, 
such an assertion cannot answer the question about whether this intrinsic worth resides in 
the objective or in the subjective realm. That is to say, if one asserts that the intrinsic 
value is actually something inherent within the object, then one will be hard pressed to 
demonstrate objective criteria without appealing to some psychological explanations. On 
the other hand, if one bites the bullet and claims that the intrinsic value of beauty lies in 
the viewer’s belief that it is valuable for its own sake, then the traditional account takes a 
Kantian turn and seems to say more about the pre-existing conditions for having an 
aesthetic experience than it does about the experience itself. What this amounts to, 
concretely, is the claim that we must be mentally prepared to have an aesthetic 
experience before we can actually have one. However, this flies in the face of our 
everyday experience, wherein aesthetic moments often times just sneak up on us. It is not 
difficult to imagine someone being unexpectedly enraptured by some particularly 
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beautiful vista, and yet continue to insist that the experience was an aesthetic one. Thus, 
Carroll believes, the traditional account fails insofar as it cuts us off from much of what 
we would consider perfectly natural aspects of everyday life.13  
The next target Carroll chooses is what he calls the pragmatic account of aesthetic 
experience. But, since it is that account I wish to compare directly with Carroll’s own 
deflationary view, I will postpone treatment of that analysis until the end of this section. 
Instead, I will move directly to the third account of aesthetic experience from which 
Carroll hopes to disabuse art philosophies, viz. the allegorical, which he traces back to the 
work of the Critical Theorists, Herbert Marcuse and T.W. Adorno.  
Although Marcuse and Adorno never explicitly touted a particular view of 
aesthetic experience, they did share a belief that encounters with art could serve as 
sobering agents that could provide clarity about a social milieu. As Carroll sums up 
Marcuse’s stance, 
By being unreal…fiction awakens experience to the possibility that things 
could be otherwise – experience in general could be more like what is now 
often only found in aesthetic experience, an opportunity to allow 
imagination and sensibility free rein.14 
   
In this regard, Carroll claims, Marcuse believed that aesthetic experience could provide 
us with a suggestive resemblance, an immediate symbol, for a better social order, i.e. it 
could offer us social hope. Likewise, according to Carroll, Adorno believed that the basic 
 
13 This is essential; for the opportunity Carroll squanders in not enlisting Dewey hinges on the difference 
between the common philosophical understanding of experience and the manner in which Dewey employed 
the term. In several of his early essays, Dewey laid the foundation for the more robust treatment of 
experience, exemplified by Experience and Nature (1925) and Art as Experience (1934), which he hoped 
would redeem the term by having it “returned to its idiomatic usages.” But, he did not mean an idiom that 
is tantamount to vulgarity or simplicity. Rather, Dewey sought a return to thinking about experience in less 
dissected, philosophically abstract terms that could avoid many of the conceptual eddies plaguing 
philosophy for centuries by reminding us “that philosophy must not be a study of philosophy, but a study, 
by means of philosophy, of life-experience and our beliefs about and in this experience.” [Dewey 
Experience and Nature, p. 37] 
14 Carroll, p. 52 
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social function of art was to have no function, to be free from and thus to negate the 
extant social order, engendering at once both the conditions for social hope and social 
criticism. The implication of the critical theorist’s approach to art is that aesthetic 
experience sits in relationship to social reality in much the same way as a particular 
allegory sits in relationship to a larger narrative. Aesthetic experience affords us a 
glimpse of the “moral of the story” of our social plight, it can be utopian and hopeful as it 
was for Marcuse, or emancipatory and revolutionary as it was for Adorno. On the 
allegorical view, Carroll explains, aesthetic experience is pitted as a protagonist against 
instrumentality and market rationality in the struggle to save intrinsic value. Through 
aesthetic experience, the imagination is opened up to play, free from the conceptual 
apparatus of concrete life. But, this view of aesthetic experience, then would be strikingly 
similar to the traditional view. Critical theorists, like Marcuse and Adorno, who held up 
the allegorical account believed that by positing free play of the imagination, they had 
accounted for the content of aesthetic experience for which the traditional account had 
simply glossed over. But, by failing to account for how the imagination is to freely play 
without concepts, these thinkers allowed the nose of the camel back into the tent. For, if 
aesthetic experience is a coup d'oeil of an ideal society, or even the progenitor of social 
criticism, then it would seem as dependent on the notion of disinterestedness as the 
traditional account. Consequently, Critical theorists should hardly be surprised when the 
camel of disinterestedness noses its way back in – and devours the whole tent.  
 The reasons the allegorical account fails, then, are along similar lines to those of 
the traditional account, but with perhaps an even more damaging conclusion. While it is 
unclear that disinterestedness and imaginative free rein are actually components of every 
aesthetic experience, Carroll believes that the most important counter claim to the 
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allegorical account is the availability of other likely narrative explanations. In other 
words, because neither disinterestedness nor cognitive free rein provides the force of 
argument that demands that we accept it, the opposition of aesthetic experience to market 
rationality and instrumental value turns on what is, at best, considered a contingent fact 
about art – that it affords insight into social order. Or, as Carroll puts it,  
…if the allegorical account is supposed to figure aesthetic experience as a 
metaphor for the possibility of noninstrumental, nonmarket rationality, 
then, since the features of aesthetic experience it valorizes seem 
questionable, the metaphor is inapt.15  
 
Now that Carroll’s objections to both the traditional and allegorical accounts have 
been elucidated, we turn our attention toward his account of aesthetic experience. 
Although Carroll does not offer an explanation for why he chose to call his account 
“deflationary,” the name is appropriate in at least two regards. First and foremost, he 
hopes his account will diminish the importance of disinterestedness to art theory, i.e. 
“deflate” it. Secondly, he believes that his account renders the notion of aesthetic 
experience more inclusive, insofar as it widens the parameters that other accounts had 
used to define it. In this way, Carroll’s account is “deflationary” insofar as it grants the 
notion of aesthetic experience more purchasing power.          
The first thing that should be noted about this alternative is its emphasis on the 
content of aesthetic experience. Carroll is concerned with what actually goes on during 
the process of aesthetic experience, and believes that, paradigmatically, it hangs on one of 
two features. The first of these is what he calls “design appreciation,” which occurs 
whenever we regard the structural elements of an artwork. As he puts it, “The formalists 
were wrong to think that this is the only sort of thing that counts as aesthetic experience. 
But surely it is one of the possible ways of attending to artworks that we standardly refer 
 
15 Carroll, p. 58 
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to as aesthetic experience.”16 The second feature is what Carroll calls “quality detection,” 
which, by his lights, depends more on sensuous cognition than it does formal structure. 
Whenever we are moved emotionally by a particular artwork, we can properly say that 
we are having an aesthetic experience. According to Carroll, these two features – design 
appreciation and quality detection – are each sufficient for aesthetic experience. 
Whenever one is present, we can properly say that an aesthetic experience was had. But, 
this is not meant to suggest that they are mutually exclusive, either. Both can, and often 
do, occur together in one art encounter. The deflationary account, Carroll claims, “does 
not propose some common feature between these two kinds of experience, like 
disinterestedness, that constitutes the essence of aesthetic experience,” and, more 
importantly, it allows for other “modes” of experience to be included as art-appropriate 
responses wherever they exhibit “the same intuitive fitness and convergence on 
precedent,” as these more typical modes.17      
“Intuitive fitness” and “convergence on precedent” are important for Carroll 
because of their narrative aspects. As he puts it, “following a narrative involves a sense of 
the direction of the narrative as it unfolds, and a sense of intelligibility or fitness when 
earlier events are conjoined with later events in the narrative.”18 Non-aesthetic art 
responses can, on Carroll’s account, be considered appropriate whenever they fit within 
the set of common responses shared by a community. That is to say, if a response makes 
sense within the story a community can tell about itself – including where it has been and 
where it sees itself heading – then that response is just as appropriate as design 
appreciation or quality detection are to the overall experience of the work. Of course, it 
 
16 Carroll, p. 59 
17 Ibid. p. 60 
18 Ibid. p. 132 
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must be noted that Carroll’s point is descriptive, not prescriptive. He is not trying to 
decide for us which responses we should have, he merely hopes to show that the 
experience of a particular work is as dependent upon our historical, cultural, and 
geographical situatedness as it is upon our formal and emotive discernments; he hopes to 
show that the way we react to art is less a matter of discovering structures as it is a matter 
of interpreting, or conversing with, an artwork. In this vein, Carroll says, interpretation is 
not only a response that is as basic as the typically aesthetic responses, but it is intimately 
connected to each, as well. “For,” Carroll writes,  
insofar as design appreciation involves discerning the structure of an 
artwork relative to its points or purposes, design appreciation will 
generally require interpretation in order to isolate those points and 
purposes. Likewise quality detection will usually be ineliminable in 
interpreting the thematic viewpoints of artworks.19 
 
Thus, Carroll believes, he has successfully reunited the approaches of the decipherer and 
the aesthete by pointing to what they have in common with regard to aesthetic 
experiences. To re-capitulate, those commonalities are: 
a) design appreciation,  
b) quality detection,  
c) intuitive fitness, and  
d) convergence on precedent. 
 
 
3. The Pragmatic Notion of Aesthetic Experience 
What is left for us to distinguish is the difference between Carroll’s deflationary 
account of aesthetic experience, and what he takes to be the central tenets of the 
pragmatic account. Of this view, Carroll claims, “It might just as easily be called the 
structural account, since it characterizes aesthetic experience in terms of its putative 
 
19 Carroll, p. 61 
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internal structure or rhythm.”20 However, the pragmatic account, by Carrorll’s lights, is 
different from the traditional account insofar as it leaves aside the issue of the viewer’s 
belief about an experience and focuses squarely on the content of the experience. In this 
regard, Carroll sees the pragmatic account as rejecting the notion of disinterestedness and 
embracing a model of aesthetic experience that is “interactional” rather than “perceptual.”  
With regard to this last point, Carroll’s characterization is accurate, since the most 
salient point of Dewey’s philosophy, particularly during his later “naturalist” period 
(1925-1952) in which Art as Experience appeared, is that experience is inextricably 
linked to the context of nature.21 Dewey’s naturalism hinged upon the notion that human 
beings can best be understood through their relationships with their surroundings.22 As he 
put it, “The nature of experience is determined by the essential conditions of life. While 
man is other than bird and beast, he shares basic vital functions with them and has to 
make the same basal adjustments if he is to continue the process of living.”23 On such an 
account, experience becomes a singular, holistic affair precisely “because the interaction 
of live creature and environing conditions is involved in the very process of living.”24 
And, “if one wishes to describe anything truly, his task is to tell what it is experienced as 
being.”25  
This last thought is what led Dewey to look for the general characteristics of 
experience. Perhaps this is the feature of Dewey’s thought that Carroll views as too much 
 
20 Carroll, p. 49 
21 In his introduction to Dewey’s On Experience, Nature, and Freedom, Richard Bernstein identifies three 
distinct periods in Dewey’s thought, each lasting approximately twenty years.  
22 Richard Shusterman has called this Dewey’s “somatic naturalism.” See his Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living 
Beauty, Rethinking Art. 
23 Dewey, John. Art as Experience. Vol. 10 in The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953. Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1967-1987, p. 19 
24 Ibid. p. 42 
25 Dewey, John. “The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism,” Vol. 3 in The Middle Works of John Dewey, 
1899-1924. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967-1987, p. 158 
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“like an abstract scenario.” He points out that a few of the characteristics Dewey 
identified, viz. “duration, qualitative unity, and temporal integration and closure,” are far 
too restrictive to be criteria for an aesthetic experience. However, Carroll is mistaken if 
he takes Dewey to have asserted that these features are necessary structures of 
experience, aesthetic or otherwise.  
Carroll seems to have fallen prey to the common mischaracterization of Dewey’s 
work as the “metaphysics of experience” – a phrase Dewey himself used and later 
lamented having ever written. Richard Rorty, among others, helped make the phrase part 
of the mainstream of Deweyan scholarship by comparing it with what he often called “the 
metaphysics of presence.” Under this reading, Dewey’s conception of experience is the 
cornerstone upon which the edifice of his theory of reality is built, i.e. Dewey allegedly 
presents experience as a metaphysical first principle. Rorty often counted Dewey among 
the thinkers he liked to call “system builders” or (more disparagingly) “metaphysicians.” 
Yet, while Dewey’s account of experience could be characterized as systematic, and 
Rorty is not the first philosopher to refer to Dewey’s work on experience as a 
“metaphysics” (cf. the first chapter of John McDermott’s The Philosophy of John 
Dewey), he is probably not a metaphysician in the sense that Rorty portrays him.26 As 
Michael Eldridge puts it in his Transforming Experience (1998), “Rorty’s view, 
moreover, still seems infected by the psychic interpretation – experience is a person’s 
thinking-feeling reaction to events.”27 Likewise, Raymond Boisvert has pointed out in the 
introduction of his excellent volume entitled Dewey’s Metaphysics (1988) that Dewey 
 
26 Rorty has also written that “it is unlikely that we shall find, in Experience and Nature, anything which 
can be called a ‘meataphysics of experience’ as opposed to to a theraputic treatment of the tradition…” 
(Consequences of Pragmatism  pg. 77) However, this statement seems more an emphasis on the 
“therapeutic Dewey” of Rorty’s fashioning and less a claim about Dewey’s work on experience. 
27 Eldridge, Michael. Transforming Experience. Vanderbilt University Press, 1998, p. 14 
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followed Aristotle in his conception of “metaphysics”, i.e. he viewed metaphysics as a 
study of existence qua existence.28 As Dewey saw it, since existence is comprised of 
countless subject matters, “metaphysics” is the study of the generic traits that all subject 
matters of existence share in common, one of the most important of which is “change” – 
which for Dewey was completely infused with Darwinian insights. Such a study, then, 
would be concerned with the relationship of active organisms within a dynamic natural 
world, and accordingly, the study itself should be organic and dynamic. Boisvert goes on 
to explain that Dewey’s view of metaphysics is perhaps better aligned with the current 
conception of “ontology”, and as evidence points to the fact that he used the terms 
interchangeably in his writings. This is perhaps one reason why many Deweyan scholars 
tend to agree with R.W. Sleeper that, “It would be better to say that Dewey’s metaphysics 
of experience is not a metaphysics of experience at all than to risk assuming that it is just 
another species of the kind of metaphysics embodied in Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason.”29        
Carroll would be correct were he to suggest that Dewey, at one time, hoped to 
account for the structure of experience via the generic traits of experience (particularly in 
his 1903 Studies in Logical Theory), however, by the time Dewey reached his naturalistic 
period, he had abandoned such a project. Dewey discovered, through the course of his 
career, composing a complete list of the generic traits of experience would prove virtually 
impossible. He gave one last effort in Experience and Nature, but he never claimed to 
offer an exhaustive account. In later works, he would often seemingly discover new traits, 
ad hoc, in order to make a point in some other line of argumentation. But, to attempt a 
 
28 Boisvert. Raymond. Dewey’s Metaphysics. New York: Fordham University Press, 1988, p. 3 
29 Sleeper, Ralph W. The Necessity of Pragmatism. New Haven: Humanities Press, 1986, p. 7 
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comprehensive list of such traits would undermine the naturalistic conception of 
experience that Dewey hoped to put on the gold standard. After all, if experience is a 
natural affair, then it must adapt to changes in the environment, which would amount to 
most of its generic traits being wholly contingent. When understood naturalistically, i.e. 
as an organism’s method of negotiating its way through an environment, the once limited 
concept of experience could be tied together with the broader concept of culture. But, this 
point seems to jibe well with Carroll’s project. This is also why Dewey himself preferred 
to speak of the modes (rather than the structures) of experience – a term Carroll also 
employs liberally.  
However, Carroll balks at Dewey’s identification of the “duration” of aesthetic 
experiences for being “too restrictive.” He argues, 
Not all aesthetic experiences extend over any appreciable duration. Some 
paintings just overwhelm you in one shot. Pow! Some Rothkos are like 
this…Nevertheless, we still regard experiences of those kinds of paintings 
as aesthetic, though they do not abet experiences of temporal integration 
or evolution…30 
  
Yet, Carroll’s reference to “duration” fails to capture what Dewey was after when he 
thought about the temporality of experience. In his writings, Dewey most often 
characterized experience as “eventful,” “precarious,” and “hazardous” in association with 
time.  Perhaps “change” could serve as a catchall for these descriptions. And while many 
critics have attributed Dewey’s emphasis on change to an abiding Hegelianism, the way 
he wrote about change and experience during his later years seems colored more by 
Aristotle and Darwin than it does by Hegel.  
This way of thinking came to Dewey through his teacher G.S. Morris from the 
German thinker Trendelenberg. The latter had been sharply influenced by Aristotle’s 
 
30 Carroll, p. 51 
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notion of potentiality-actuality and Darwin’s theory of evolution and he synthesized these 
ideas into what he called “constructive motion” – which he saw as the common trait 
between thought and being.31 On one hand, thought moves from potentiality to actuality, 
per Aristotle, as it becomes the object that is known, on the other hand, being moves from 
potentiality to actuality, per Darwin, through natural selection. This reading rendered the 
notion of telos into a type of biological end, in both nature and organisms, and set the 
table for Dewey to speak non-linearly of progress as something occurring in a means-
ends continuum, viz. as something that occurred in situations. The echoes of Aristotle and 
Darwin can be seen much later in Experience and Nature, in passages such as,  
If we consider the form or scheme of the situation in which meaning and 
understanding occur, we find an involved simultaneous presence and 
cross-reference of immediacy and efficiency, overt actuality and 
potentiality, the consummatory and instrumental,32 
 
It is by virtue of those hazards and uncertainties which attend experience, that the live 
creature has any experience, and consequently any growth, at all.  
Not until the philosophical upshots of Darwin’s work were truly felt (something 
Dewey helped to precipitate) would Greek views of permanence-through-change finally 
be relevant again in Anglo-American thought. By suggesting that a species need not be 
viewed as an antecedent “Form” or “potentiality” (something that had stymied Platonists 
and Aristotelians for ages) but rather as a dynamic, emergent, and transient, organic 
structure, Dewey’s Darwin provided the groundwork for a new naturalistic philosophy to 
take root, one that could forego divine teleological explanations and provide an organic 
point of view without re-instituting the old language of Being. As Dewey put it, 
 
31 For a more detailed description of Trendelenburg’s “constructive motion” see Boisvert, p. 22-24 
32 Dewey, John. Experience and Nature. Vol. 1 in The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953. 
Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967-1987, p. 150  
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The force of this term [species] was deepened by its application to 
everything in the universe that observes order in flux and manifests 
constancy through change. From the casual drift of daily weather, through 
the uneven recurrence of seasons and unequal return of seed time and 
harvest, up to the majestic sweep of the heavens – the image of eternity in 
time – and from this to the unchanging pure and contemplative 
intelligence beyond nature lies one unbroken fulfilment [sic.] of ends. 
Nature as a whole is a progressive realization of purpose strictly 
comparable to the realization of purpose in any single plant or animal.33 
  
This “order in flux” is what led Dewey to posit continuity as a generic characteristic of 
experience. Alexander and others have asserted this to be key to Dewey’s metaphysics 
and to his notion of “an experience” in his aesthetics. In Alexander’s words, “By 
connecting potentiality with naturalism, Dewey successfully allowed for the realization 
of human meanings, values, and ideals as genuine possibilities of nature. In this manner 
he avoids a reductionistic naturalism by espousing an emergentism.”34 Carroll fails to 
recognize this, and instead speaks reductively of the “qualitative unity” in Dewey’s 
aesthetics. He reads Dewey as advocating a “bounded unity” for individual experiences. 
Yet, on Dewey’s view, experience is not at all atomistic, but rather is “pregnant with 
connections,” i.e. experience continuously flows from one part to the next – it is not 
simply a succession of events.  
Continuity, for Dewey, is of vital importance to experience since, without it, the 
moments of change would spill over into chaos. As Dewey wrote in Art as Experience, 
“To overpass the limits that are set is destruction and death… In a world of mere flux, 
change would not be cumulative; it would not move toward a close. Stability and rest 
would have no being,”35 But, this order is not fixed in the sense of being static; it is 
dynamic and rhythmic, “fixed” in the sense of being directed and connective. Again, 
 
33 Dewey, John. “The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy,” Vol. 4 in The Middle Works of John Dewey, 
1899-1924. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967-1987, p. 5-6 
34 Alexander, Thomas. John Dewey’s Theory of Art, Experience and Nature: The Horizons of Feeling. New 
York: State University of New York Press, 1987, p. 57 
35 Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 22 
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Dewey wrote, “All interactions that effect stability and order in the whirling flux of 
change are rhythms. There is ebb and flow, systole and diastole: ordered change. The 
latter moves within bounds.”36  
Carroll hears “bounds,” and takes Dewey to be advocating a type of experiential 
compartmentalism, whereas Dewey used the term to indicate that the only reason we can 
even make sense of a new moment in experience is because of the moments that came 
before it, coupled with the expectations of what future moments may provide. Simply 
put, any notion of boundaries must be set by the flow of experience alone. In this way, 
according to Dewey, experience is also historical, i.e. it has narrative characteristics 
which seem to raise particular events above the otherwise continuous flow of moments. 
Averted catastrophes, a meal enjoyed in Paris, a storm passed through on an oversea 
voyage, all exemplify the type of event which Dewey would call, “an experience.”  
However, it is important to note that the movement “toward a close” to which 
Dewey alluded does not signify a move toward some ultimate end. Rather, for Dewey, it 
is a move toward an intermediate “end-in-view,” which is itself, along with the means to 
attaining it, still a part of the flow of experience. This is the crux of Carroll’s 
misunderstanding of Dewey. Carroll believes that the locus of Dewey’s structuralism is 
his notion of “consummatory experience,” which is a mechanism  Dewey introduced to 
account for how we might cultivate aesthetic experiences. As Carrol puts it,  
Dewey thinks that with regard to encounters with artworks something like 
a qualitative feeling tone emerges that selectively governs our sense of 
what belongs and what doesn’t in our experience, thereby setting up an 
internal boundary between aesthetic experiences and surrounding 
circumstances.37   
 
 
36 Ibid. [emphasis added] 
37 Carroll, p. 51 
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This “qualitative feeling tone” to which Carroll refers is what Dewey called “selective 
interest,” and he described it in the active terms of significance, inquiry, and 
communication rather than in the passive terms of “feeling.” On Dewey’s account, an 
event – such as an averted catastrophe, a meal enjoyed, or a storm endured – is historical 
insofar as, “the points of its incidence shift in successive observations of it… It carries on 
and is, therefore, instrumental as well as final,”38 Like Carroll, Dewey urged that each of 
these experiences has a unique quality that defies communication, some attribute that is 
wholly immediate and therefore not an object of knowledge. These qualities are not 
subjective, they belong, as Dewey asserted, both to the thing experienced and the one 
experiencing them. Dewey claimed that,     
In such experiences, every successive part flows freely, without seam and 
without unfilled blanks, into what ensues. At the same time there is no 
sacrifice of the self-identity of the parts. A river, as distinct from a pond, 
flows. But its flow gives a definiteness and interest to its successive 
portions greater than exist in the homogenous portions of a pond. In an 
experience, flow is from something to something.39 
 
Accordingly, experience consists, writ-large, of innumerably intertwined beginnings and 
endings in which these types of affairs may arise. Selective interest allows us to pick out 
which moments we will bundle up together out of the continuous flow to call an 
experience. When this happens, meaning is imparted to the event and it becomes 
communicative insofar as it directs us back to something beyond itself, namely the 
background of surrounding moments. Thus, another generic trait of experience is 
communication, or expression. The immediacy of the event is unified and heightened by 
the stable order of expression. Dewey tells us this is life in its most robust form.  
Experience in the degree in which it is experience is heightened vitality. 
Instead of signifying being shut up within one's own private feelings and 
 
38 Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 144 
39 Ibid. p. 43 
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sensations, it signifies active and alert commerce with the world; at its 
height it signifies complete interpenetration of self and the world of 
objects and events. Instead of signifying surrender to caprice and disorder, 
it affords our sole demonstration of a stability that is not stagnation but is 
rhythmic and developing.40 
 
Dewey refers to these heightened moments as “consummatory experiences.” But, Carroll 
has been misled by the ambiguity that the term ushers in. On one hand, it can mean 
“closure” in the sense of completion or culmination as in “the consummation of 
marriage,” which is how Carroll has understood it. On the other hand, it can refer to 
something that is complete in the sense of needing no qualification, as in (pejoratively) 
“the consummate fool,” and it is this latter meaning, i.e. “without qualification,” that 
Dewey wished to evoke. A consummatory experience, on his view, is a grouping of 
moments that stand out from the rest of experience, like a great meal, a terrible storm, or 
a beautiful sculpture. Dewey called such a grouping “an experience” because it needs no 
further qualification. It stands alone as a representative of the rest of the moments 
surrounding it. These consummatory experiences serve as exemplars that structure our 
experience into manageable components, and since reflecting upon every moment in 
experience would prove impossible, we could not reflect upon anything at all without this 
ordered structure. That is not to say, however, that once an experience reaches 
consummation, that it has come to an end, but rather, as Dewey claimed, “The time of 
consummation is also one of beginning anew.”41 Consummatory experiences, then, are 
pauses, not breaks, in the continuity of experience. This is how a rhythmic order is 
established. 
In rhythmic ordering, every close and pause, like the rest in music, 
connects as well as delimits and individualizes. A pause in music is not a 
blank, but is a rhythmic silence that punctuates what is done while at the 
 
40 Ibid. p. 25 
41 Ibid. p. 23 
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same time it conveys an impulsion forward, instead of arresting at the 
point which it defines.42 
 
But, this rhythmic order is not merely established temporally, “The proportionate 
interception of changes establishes an order that is spatially… patterned,” as well.43 With 
this, Dewey hoped to establish that a consummatory experience, while dependent upon 
the surrounding moments of experience, is also dependent upon the surrounding 
environment and the surrounding community of observers. If musical rhythm is the 
temporal analog to consummatory experience, then the spatial analog might be the 
rhythm of ocean waves. Each trough delimits each wave crest, but to say that waves are 
separated by troughs would belie fluid dynamics. On the micro level, water molecules are 
all connected in a processional, circular movement, on the macro level, troughs flow into 
waves and call attention to them, giving significance to each. If we understand this 
connection and are able to internalize it, we will understand what Dewey meant by 
experience and operate within our surroundings more harmoniously. As Dewey put it,  
Contrast of lack and fullness, of struggle and achievement, of adjustment 
after consummated irregularity, form the drama in which action, feeling, 
and meaning are one… Inner harmony is made only when, by some 
means, terms are made with the environment.44  
 
Because these consummatory experiences are dynamic, i.e. they move through 
experience with us, they can always be re-evaluated. The consummatory phase, therefore, 
is an ongoing process, it has duration and recurrence, and it can rise and subside in 
relation to the flow of experience. This feature of experience, that it can be 
consummatory, illustrates the formation of context. As Dewey wrote in “Context and 
Thought,” an essay that sits in his career roughly halfway between Experience and 
 
42 Ibid. p. 177  
43 Ibid. p. 22 
44 Ibid. p. 22-23 
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Nature and Art as Experience, “Context includes at least those matters which for brevity I 
shall call background and selective interest… Background is both temporal and 
spatial.”45 In what follows, I will explicate how consummatory experience leads to the 
formation of context and what Dewey meant by calling context a ‘background.’ 
 
4. Experience and Context 
What is of the greatest importance for Dewey’s account of experience is the 
context within which the experience takes place. But, what exactly is context? In 
Dewey’s philosophy it is,  
…the whole environment of which philosophy must take account in all its 
enterprises. A background is implicit in some form and to some degree in 
all thinking, although as background it does not come into explicit 
purview; that is, it does not form a portion of the subject matter which is 
consciously attended to, thought of, examined, inspected, turned over.46 
   
But, merely calling it a background, offers little in the way of clarification. Again, this 
notion must be tied to Dewey’s naturalism in order to grasp its import. The generic traits 
of an experience are not foundations or primitives on Dewey’s view, but rather arise from 
the commerce of organisms and environments; i.e. they arise from the “situation.” As 
Dewey would put it in a famous exchange with George Santayana,  
Experience, thus conceived, constitutes, in Santayana's happy phrase, a 
foreground. But it is the foreground of nature…Apparently he conceives 
of the foreground as lying between human intuition and experience and 
the background; to me human experiencing is the foreground, nature's 
own. He also may think that the background alone is nature to the 
exclusion of the foreground; I am not sure. But I am sure that the 
foreground is itself a portion of nature, an integral portion…. So I repeat 
that while "consciousness" is foreground in a preeminent sense, 
 
45 Dewey, John. “Context and Thought,” Vol. 6 in The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953. 
Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967-1987, p. 11 
46 Ibid. 
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experience is much more than consciousness and reaches down into the 
background as that reaches up into experience.47 
 
This view of experience as a foreground of nature can be summed up in Dewey’s phrase 
– “the live creature” – which he made heavy use of in his aesthetics. For Dewey, the live 
creature was a designation for organisms which could emphasize the relational link to an 
environing bio-social context while at the same time account for cognition. Dewey 
identified three manifestations of the background he referred to as context, each 
corresponding to a particular type of interaction within experience.  
The first manifestation of context, according to Dewey’s account, arises from the 
physical interaction of creatures with environments. The context of this interaction is the 
organism itself. Simply put, all experience is embodied; it is of bodies, not in them. As 
Dewey argued, the context of any experience is both organic, i.e. it is of and related to an 
experiencing organism, or live creature, as well as holistic, i.e. its organic aspects should 
not be separated from non-organic ones. He wrote,  
The organism, self, ego, subject, give it whatever name you choose, is 
implicated in all thinking as in all eating, business, or play. Since it cannot 
in its entirety be made an explicit object of reflection and yet since it 
affects all matters thought of, it is legitimately called a phase of context .48 
 
But, as we have seen, Dewey rejected the distinction between subject and object, and his 
use of terms commonly associated with subjectivity should therefore not be construed as 
a moment of hedging. He used these terms in this passage in order to distinguish between 
subjectivity understood as a kind of “detached observer” and subjectivity as a 
“determining attitude” or “interest.” Of the former sense, which is often set in opposition 
to the “view from nowhere” of objectivity, he claimed, “A standpoint which is nowhere 
 
47 Dewey, John. “Half-Hearted Naturalism,” Vol. 3 in The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953. 
Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967-1987, p. 76-8 
48 Dewey, John. “Context and Thought,” p. 14 
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in particular and from which things are not seen at a special angle is an absurdity,” and of 
the latter sense, “Interest, as the subjective, is after all equivalent to individuality or 
uniqueness.”49 The difference, according to Dewey, arises out of a special characteristic 
of subjectivity, viz. that although it is involved in all thinking it can never itself fully be 
made into an object of thought.50 Subjectivity in this second sense, i.e. as selective 
interest, then, is also a phase of context. Again, Dewey warns against letting selective 
interest run amok in philosophical thought,  
Thinking is always thinking, but philosophic thinking is, upon the whole, 
at the extreme end of the scale of distance from the active urgency of 
concrete situations. It is because of this fact that neglect of context is the 
besetting fallacy of philosophical thought.51 
 
But, as we saw above, selective interest is necessary in order to form a consummatory 
experience. So, if one wants to avoid letting selective interest run amok, it would seem 
that selective interest is only desirable up to a limit. Dewey argued that selecting out of 
specific contexts, such as selecting a particularly good meal out of the context of a 
Parisian vacation, only becomes a problem when it is converted “into abstraction from all 
context whatsoever.”52 This raises an issue of inclusion. Dewey implies that it is possible 
to select out of a particular context and yet still have that which has been selected be 
included within some still wider context. As we have seen, when the appropriate amount 
of selective interest is applied to the continuous flow of experiential moments “an 
experience” is formed. The ensuing background of that consummatory experience 
represents the second manifestation of context, viz. the background of consummatory 
experiences as such which arises out of the psychophysical interaction of experience that 
 
49 Ibid. p. 14-5 
50 Dewey followed Peirce in this regard [cf. Peirce, Charles Sanders. “Some Consequences of Four 
Incapacities.” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, vol. 2 1868, p. 140-157].  
51 Dewey, “Context and Thought,” p. 17 
52 Ibid. p. 16 
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is known as reflection. Or, simply put, the second layer of context involves thinking 
about the projects one sets for oneself. 
Just as Carroll invokes “intuitive fitness” in his deflationary account, so did 
Dewey see the natural way of dealing with objects that arise in the problematic situation 
in terms of value, i.e. they either have positive or negative value in regard to aiding the 
organism in escaping indeterminacy. He saw value a product of inquiry, arising from a 
non-cognitive mode of experience. Dewey believed [and Carroll seems to agree] that 
there is nothing – no fact, object, or entity – that has intrinsic value antecedent to 
whatever purpose the situation brings to the table. For instance, the philosopher, 
carpenter, artist, and environmentalist may each view a particular tree in different ways, 
but it would be senseless to assert that any one of them sees the tree “as it is in itself.” 
The tree has a value, of course, regardless of whichever view one takes, but its value is 
always dependent on a particular end. So, the environmentalist may value the tree 
because of its ability to slow erosion, the artist for its symmetry, the carpenter for the 
quality of the wood, and the philosopher because of the noise it might not make when it 
falls, but each values the tree for the function it fulfills in attaining some end. Dewey 
called this type of transaction with one’s surroundings, “valuation.” Simply put, valuation 
involves the habit, or capacity, of ranking several preferences in the order of which will 
be most beneficial in alleviating the irritation of indeterminacy. But, this habit is only a 
proto-process of means-ends manipulation, it lacks the more complex capacity of dealing 
with objects as abstract signs, and as such, Dewey saw it as affective rather than 
cognitive.53 While the affective types of strategy toward indeterminacy may involve 
 
53 There have been many thinkers who sought to cast aside the fact-value distinction. Dewey was one such 
thinker. He argued that the relationship between facts and values resembles a spectrum more than it does 
one of polar opposites. There are many things on the fact side of that spectrum. But, even those things have 
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minimal cognitive capacity, since it gets “worked out in terms of concrete conditions 
available for its realization, i.e. in terms of means,” it still cannot provide knowledge, but 
only a type of repeatable norm, i.e. a “value” that can help avoid indeterminacy.54  
If selective interest leads both to the formulation of consummatory experience and 
to context, then it would seem that experience is, in the very least, intimately related to 
context. But, Dewey claimed that in the most general terms, they are not merely related 
but are actually identical. As he put it, “If the finally significant business of philosophy is 
the disclosure of the context of beliefs, then we cannot escape the conclusion that 
experience is the name for the last inclusive context.”55 In this broad sense, experience 
and nature are contiguous, if not synonymous, and since Dewey saw experience as a 
matter of interaction between organisms and environments, perhaps a better word for 
experience in this regard would be “culture.” And, if we understand culture as any 
particular group’s body of knowledge and values, each of which involves belief, then the 
“business of philosophy” would be the disclosure of culture. Understood in this way, 
experience bestows meanings on an environment, meanings that can be transmitted to 
later generations through narratives. Once experience in general has gained these 
communicative, contextual qualities it can open up the possibility for new, more 
exclusive, contexts. As a result of this communicative interaction within experience, 
culture/nature would represent the third and most inclusive manifestation of context. As 
Dewey wrote in an unfinished revision to the first chapter of Experience and Nature,  
The name "culture" in its anthropological…sense designates the vast range 
of things experienced in an indefinite variety of ways. It possesses as a 
 
some value imparted to them by the organism, through the process of valuation. Likewise, those things that 
sit far on the value side, e.g. the morally or aesthetically praiseworthy, still have some fact of the matter 
about them. 
54 Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, Vol. 14 in The Middle Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953. 
Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967-1987, p. 217 
55 Dewey, “Context and Thought,” p. 20 
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name just that body of substantial references which "experience" as a 
name has lost.56 
 
And, elsewhere he wrote,  
Were I to write (or rewrite) Experience and Nature today I would entitle 
the book Culture and Nature…because of my growing realization that the 
historical obstacles which prevented understanding of my use of 
“experience” are, for all practical purposes, insurmountable. …“culture” 
designates…that immense diversity of human affairs.57 
 
Thus, it would seem Dewey’s view of experience could be summed up in a single word – 
“contextualism.” By making the connection of human bodies, affairs, and communities 
with the natural realm the primary focus of his empirical method, Dewey “deflated” the 
need for explaining reality, and ipso facto art, in any absolute form.  
As we have seen, whether one is experiencing an art object like a decipherer or an 
aesthete, Carroll’s deflationary view holds that all one is doing is simply weaving that 
experience into a narrative through intuitive fitness and convergence on precedent. 
Dewey’s view, which highlighted the continuous, historical, and communicative elements 
of experience in order to disclose context, seems aimed at the same point. This seems 
apparent once we consider the statement offered by Abraham Edel and Elizabeth Flower 
in their introduction to the seventh volume of Dewey’s later works:  
The extension that the reference to context gives may be spatial as well as 
temporal, bringing in the circumambient phenomena that illuminate: for 
example, a picture of a person running will not tell us whether he is in a 
marathon, trying to catch a bus, or escaping from a bull. Temporally, an 
event is illuminated by being set as part of a narrative in which it has 
interrelations to other events. Finally, identifying the context as including 
a background of culture and theory opens the door to full sociocultural 
interpretation under the rubric of “context” – that is by relation to people 
around the agent in both space and time and their ways and characters and 
institutions.58 
 
56 Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 363 
57 Ibid. p. 361 
58 Dewey, John. Ethics. Vol. 7 in The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953. Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 1967-1987, p. xxxii 
 30 
 
This passage is worth quoting at length, because it demonstrates how Dewey’s view 
could be used as grist for Carroll’s mill insofar as he seeks to call into question the habits 
and institutions which have historically colored our ways of thinking about art. 
 
 
 
 
